Hydrochasma: Previously Unknown Group Targets Medical and Shipping Organizations in Asia
No custom malware deployed in attack campaign that appears to rely exclusively on open-source tools.
Shipping companies and medical laboratories in Asia are being targeted in a likely intelligence-gathering campaign that relies exclusively on publicly available and living-off-the-land tools.
Hydrochasma, the threat actor behind this campaign, has not been linked to any previously identified group, but appears to have a possible interest in industries that may be involved in COVID-19-related treatments or vaccines.
This activity has been ongoing since at least October 2022. While Symantec, by Broadcom Software, did not see any data being exfiltrated in this campaign, the targets, as well as some of the tools used, indicate that the most likely motivation in this campaign is intelligence gathering.
The infection vector used by Hydrochasma was most likely a phishing email. The first suspicious activity seen on machines is a lure document with a file name in the victim organization’s native language that appears to indicate it was an email attachment:
[TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL] Product Specification-Freight-Company Qualification Information wps-pdf Export.pdf.exe
Another lure document appears to be mimicking a resume:
[TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL] [REDACTED] University-Development Engineer.exe
Following initial access on one machine, the attackers were seen dropping Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP), a tool that can expose a local server that is sitting behind an NAT or firewall to the internet. This drops a legitimate Microsoft Edge update file:
Another file, %TEMP%\msedgeupdate.dll, is then seen on victim machines. But this file is actually Meterpreter, a tool that is part of the Metasploit framework and which can be used for remote access.
Other tools that were subsequently seen on this victim’s network included:
- Gogo scanning tool: An automated scanning engine originally designed for use by red teams.
- Process Dumper (lsass.exe): A tool that allows attackers to dump domain passwords.
- Cobalt Strike Beacon: An off-the-shelf tool that can be used to execute commands, inject other processes, elevate current processes, or impersonate other processes, and upload and download files. It ostensibly has legitimate uses as a penetration testing tool but is invariably exploited by malicious actors.
- AlliN scanning tool: A pentesting scan tool that can be used for lateral penetration of the intranet.
- Fscan: A publicly available hacktool that can scan for open ports and more.
- Dogz proxy tool: A free VPN proxy tool.
A shellcode loader and a corrupted portable executable (PE) file were also deployed on this victim’s network.
Other tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed being used in this campaign included:
- SoftEtherVPN: The presence of this tool was what first prompted Symantec researchers to investigate this activity. It is free, open-source, and cross-platform VPN software.
- Procdump: Microsoft Sysinternals tool for monitoring an application for CPU spikes and generating crash dumps, but which can also be used as a general process dump utility.
- BrowserGhost: A publicly available tool that can grab passwords from an internet browser.
- Gost proxy: A tunneling tool.
- Ntlmrelay: An NTLM relay attack allows an attacker to intercept validated authentication requests in order to access network services.
- Task Scheduler: Allows tasks to be automated on a computer.
- Go-strip: Used to make a Go binary smaller in size.
- HackBrowserData: An open-source tool that can decrypt browser data.
The tools deployed by Hydrochasma indicate a desire to achieve persistent and stealthy access to victim machines, as well as an effort to escalate privileges and spread laterally across victim networks.
While Symantec researchers didn’t observe data being exfiltrated from victim machines, some of the tools deployed by Hydrochasma do allow for remote access and could potentially be used to exfiltrate data. The sectors targeted also point towards the motivation behind this attack being intelligence gathering.
The lack of custom malware used in this attack is also notable. Relying exclusively on living-off-the-land and publicly available tools can help make an attack stealthier, while also making attribution more difficult. Symantec did not see evidence to link this activity to a known actor, prompting us to create the new actor identity of Hydrochasma for those behind this activity.
For the latest protection updates, please visit the Symantec Protection Bulletin.
Indicators of Compromise
If an IOC is malicious and the file available to us, Symantec Endpoint products will detect and block that file.
409f89f4a00e649ccd8ce1a4a08afe03cb5d1c623ab54a80874aebf09a9840e5 – Fast Reverse Proxy
47d328c308c710a7e84bbfb71aa09593e7a82b707fde0fb9356fb7124118dc88 – GoGo Scanning Tool
6698a81e993363fab0550855c339d9a20a25d159aaa9c4b91f60bb4a68627132 – Dropper
7229bd06cb2a4bbe157d72a3734ba25bc7c08d6644c3747cdc4bcc5776f4b5b9 – Process Dumper (lsass.exe)
72885373e3e8404f1889e479b3d46dd8111280379c4065bfc1e62df093e42aba – Fast Reverse Proxy
72bc8b30df3cdde6c58ef1e8a3eae9e7882d1abe0b7d4810270b5a0cc077bb1a – Cobalt Strike Beacon
7b410fa2a93ed04a4155df30ffde7d43131c724cdf60815ee354988b31e826f8 – Fast Reverse Proxy
7f0807d40e9417141bf274ef8467a240e20109a489524e62b090bccdb4998bc6 – Process Dumper (lsass.exe)
8c0f0d1acb04693a6bdd456a6fcd37243e502b21d17c8d9256940fc7943b1e9a – Cobalt Strike Beacon
8e32ea45e1139b459742e676b7b2499810c3716216ba2ec55b77c79495901043 – Fast Reverse Proxy
981e5f7219a2f92a908459529c42747ac5f5a820995f66234716c538b19993eb – GoGo Scanning Tool
9ebd789e8ca8b96ed55fc8e95c98a45a61baea3805fd440f50f2bde5ffd7a372 – Fast Reverse Proxy
9f5f7ba7d276f162cc32791bfbaa0199013290a8ac250eb95fd90bc004c3fd36 – Cobalt Strike Beacon
a0f5966fcc64ce2d10f24e02ae96cdc91590452b9a96b3b1d4a2f66c722eec34 – AllIn Scanning Tool
cb03b5d517090b20749905a330c55df9eb4d1c6b37b1b31fae1982e32fd10009 – Fscan
d1c4968e7690fd40809491acc8787389de0b7cbc672c235639ae7b4d07d04dd4 – Shellcode Loader
de01492b44372f2e4e38354845e7f86e0be5fb8f5051baafd004ec5c1567039f – Cobalt Strike Beacon
e378d8b5a35d4ec75cae7524e64c1d605f1511f9630c671321ee46aa7c4d378b – PE File
eba22f50eedfec960fac408d9e6add4b0bd91dd5294bee8cff730db53b822841 – Dropper
fc4b5f2ee9da1fe105bb1b7768754d48f798bf181cbc53583387578a5ebc7b56 – Dogz Proxy Tool
39.101.194[.]61 – Cobalt Strike Beacon C&C
47.92.138[.]241 – Cobalt Strike Beacon C&C
alidocs.dingtalk[.]com.wswebpic[.]com – Cobalt Strike Beacon C&C
csc.zte[.]com.cn.wswebpic[.]com – Cobalt Strike Beacon C&C
taoche[.]cn.wswebpic[.]com – Cobalt Strike Beacon C&C
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